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survey over 1,200 respondents with varied exposure to refugees, and randomize information
about the consequences of hosting refugees to examine its effects on support for intervention
in Syria. Emphasizing the negative externalities of hosting refugees, including their connection
with militants, increases support for intervention among respondents who reside far from the
Turkish-Syrian border. Closer to the border, this information reduces support for intervention
in Syria. These findings highlight that vulnerability to the costs of intervention (proximity to
the border) shapes public support for intervening. We also find that public opinion towards
intervention is correlated with partisan identity and respondents’ daily exposure to refugees.
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Introduction
What factors influence support for intervention in civil wars? Previous research argues that
refugees may lead a host country to intervene in a neighboring civil war (Salehyan, 2008). Some
scholars argue that hosting refugees may impose negative externalities on the host society,1 which
in turn increase public support for intervention to stem the flow of “externalities” (refugees)
(Salehyan, 2008). Other research emphasizes the importance of partisan and ideological concerns
(Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Saideman, 2012; Rathbun et al., 2016), and the odds of success (Gelpi, Feaver
and Reifler, 2006).
Yet there are three major gaps in the understanding of how refugee flows may lead to in-
creased support for intervention. First, it is unclear that there is a causal link between the arrival
of refugees and fighting in the first place. It could be that refugee flows are correlated with other
issues such as weak state borders that lead to spreading violence, and refugee presence is a side-
effect rather than a cause of conflict.2 Second, if refugees do increase support for intervention,
then through what mechanisms does the presence of refugees influence attitudes– the percep-
tion that they lead to negative economic externalities, upsetting the host country’s ethnic balance,
or making the host country less safe)?3 Most of the previous research has studied the effects of
refugee flows on conflict at an aggregate level (country-level), but assumes a micro-mechanism
(individuals becoming prejudiced towards refugees). Finally, attitudes towards intervention are
likely to vary based on respondents’ distance from the border with Syria. Proximity to Syria can
increase the likelihood of exposure to any potential fallout from intervention (Getmansky and
Zeitzoff, 2014; Zeitzoff, 2014). For example, in Kosovo, NATO’s aerial bombing of Serbian regime
targets led–at least in the short term–to increased targeting of Kosovar refugees by the Serbian
forces, and to additional outflows of refugees to neighboring countries (Roberts, 1999). In Iraq in
1991, intervention–the establishment of a safe zone in north of the country–resulted in a different
1These include increased competition over resources, disruption of the host country’s ethnic balance, and possible
arrival of individuals with combat experience intermingled among the refugees (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006).
2There is some evidence questioning refugees’ presence as a source of contagion for conflict spread. See (Shaver and
Zhou, 2015).
3For instance, Lazarev and Sharma (2017) finds that emphasizing the shared religion of Syrian refugees reduces
prejudice of Turkish citizens, but priming related to economic costs of refugees negates this effect.
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outcome: it prevented the outflow of Kurdish refugees into the neighboring Turkey (Wolfe, 2017).
Thus, it is possible for various foreign interventions to increase or prevent outflows of refugees
from conflict area, thereby creating different preferences among the population in host country
with respect to intervention. In addition to exposure to the consequences of conflict, respondents
who reside by the border may exhibit more positive attitudes towards the refugees (Gravelle,
2014; Berezin and Dı́ez-Medrano, 2008). In this paper, we advance our understanding of support
for intervention by examining how exposure to the differential externalities of intervention influ-
ences attitudes and support for different modes of intervention. Do those that live near areas that
are likely to experience the military fallout from intervention have different views on interven-
tion, than those that do not? The distribution and regional variation in foreign policy attitudes,
especially as it relates to the costs of foreign policy is an important, and understudied point.
We examine the public opinion foundation of these claims that states intervene to solve or stop
a perceived refugee crisis. In particular we directly test the effects of different messages related
to negative perceptions that locals might hold towards refugees. We test support for interven-
tion in relation to the influx of Syrian refugees in Turkey, where approximately 4.9 million Syrians
have fled the violence due to the Syrian Civil War and found refuge in the surrounding coun-
tries (UNHCR, 2014). Indeed, from August 2016 to March 2017, Turkey–a country that hosts the
largest number of Syrian refugees–has intervened militarily in northern Syria against ISIS and
Kurdish-backed militants.4 More recently, in January 2018, Turkey launched a second operation
in northwestern Syria, called The Olive Branch, to take the city of Afrin from the Kurdish Peo-
ple’s Protection Units’ (YPG) control, and put it under the control of Turkish-backed opposition
forces in Syria (Shaheen, 2018). Although the main aim of these operations was not the return of
refugees to Syria, as a result of these two operations, about 300,00 Syrian refugees have returned
and resettled in these de-facto buffer zones in northern Syria (Reuters, 2018).
Our design distinguishes between several different outcomes including: support for using
force to remove the Syrian President Assad, using force to establish a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria,
4Turkey’s operation in Syria, called The Euphrates Shield, targeted ISIS and Kurdish militants, and led to the control
of Jarablus and Al-Bab by Turkish-backed opposition forces (BBC, 2017)
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and support for less active intervention, such as assistance to Syrian rebels in general, and to the
Islamic opposition in particular.5 We explore whether information about hosting refugees works
differently on respondents who are more likely to be exposed to the potential fallout, or violent
spillover of such intervention. To address these questions, we survey over 1,200 respondents
in Turkey – a country that has received the largest number of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2014).6
Our survey was conducted in June 2014, and focuses on southeast Turkey, where the majority
of refugees resided at that time.7 We randomize information about the potential consequences
of hosting Syrian refugees, and examine how this information affects the support of the local
population in Turkey for various forms of intervention that Turkey can undertake in Syria.
Overall, we find low support for active intervention in Syria (use of force as well as support
for the Syrian opposition).8 The public opinion is divided on the general question of Turkey’s
involvement in this conflict: whereas 51% support staying away from the Syrian conflict alto-
gether, 35% oppose this option (that is, favor some sort of involvement), and 14% are neutral
on this question. Additionally, we find that negative information about refugees, and messages
that emphasize their possible connection with militants, increase support for Turkish intervention
in Syria, including the use of force by Turkey to establish a Safe Zone in northern Syria where
these refugees could reside. Yet this effect is primarily driven by respondents who live far from
the Turkish-Syrian border. Closer to the border, negative messages about refugees actually reduce
support for intervention, or have no effect. Our findings suggest that vulnerability to the potential
fallouts of Turkish intervention in Syria9 shapes how information about the externalities of host-
ing refugees affects support for intervention. Hence, the potential costs of intervention (which are
expected to be more pronounced near the border) moderate the effects of our treatments. This is
in line with previous studies that emphasize the importance of local costs of war (Gartner, Segura
5We also ask about the respondents’ views on aligning with Assad or staying away from the conflict altogether.
6Syrian refugees are technically considered “under temporary protection” and not refugees by the Turkish govern-
ment.
7We show below that our respondents vary significantly in their exposure to refugees.
8This is in line with the findings of other public opinion surveys in Turkey (Center for Economic and Foreign Policy
Studies (EDAM), 2012; Acikmese and Unver, 2013; The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2015).
9Although the risks of intervention in Syria may affect Turkey as a whole, they are more pronounced in some areas
than in other. Even prior to the 2016 Turkish operation, the consequences of fighting in Syria–such as the shooting
down of the Syrian plane (Butler, 2014) and the rocket fire from Syria into Turkey (Pamuk, 2014), were more strongly
felt in border-adjacent areas than in places farther from the border.
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and Wilkening, 1997; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014) and violence (Dube, Dube and Garcı́a-Ponce,
2013). Far from the border, respondents are more supportive of intervention in the Syrian Civil
War, and of measures that would stem future arrival of refugees (such as creating a safe zone), and
this finding is consistent with the logic in Salehyan (2008).
We further demonstrate that our findings cannot be accounted by ethnic differences between
border and non-border areas, or individuals at the border having more knowledge about or sym-
pathy towards refugees. We also find strong partisan effects–the ruling AKP supporters are more
in favor of intervention, whereas the main opposition’s backers (CHP) are against it. Frequent
exposure to refugees is also associated with a stronger support for intervention in Syria, regard-
less of the treatment. Exposure to past violence in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is unrelated to
intervention attitudes. Finally, we find weaker effects of ethnicity, with Turkish Kurds and Arabs
slightly more in favor of intervention compared to non-minority Turks. Overall, messages about
refugees do increase the support for intervention, but the vulnerability to its fallout (proximity to
the border) moderates this effect.
In sum, our survey experiment and findings represent an important contribution to under-
standing how refugee presence shapes attitudes towards intervention for the following five rea-
sons. 1) We do not simply ask about support for intervention, but rather present respondents with
a suite of possible modes of intervention (e.g., establishing a safe zone, support Islamic opposi-
tion, etc.).10 2) Our survey samples individuals with varying exposure to refugees and the conflict
(closeness to the border), and to Turkish-Kurdish violence. 3) Perhaps most importantly, we also
incorporate an experimental component by varying information about refugees to examine how
it affects positions towards intervention. 4) In addition we employ various measures of proxim-
ity to the border with Syria–we compare border provinces and districts to those that are not by
the border, and also directly measure the respondents’ distance from the border. 5) Finally, we
10The other publicly-available surveys of Turkish attitudes towards intervention in Syria are Center for Economic
and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (2012); Acikmese and Unver (2013); The German Marshall Fund of the United
States (2015). Only the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) (2012) asks about support for using
force against the Assad regime, but does not explicitly ask whether Turkey should use force to remove Assad. The
overall low support for intervention in our survey is similar to the rate of support for intervention reported in these
other surveys.
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explore and rule out alternative explanations for our findings, for example that respondents’ eth-
nicity close to the border differs from the ethnicity of those far from the border. We do not find
support for this in the data.
In the next section, we provide background about this case. Then, we review some relevant
literature, and form hypotheses. Afterwards, we present our data and the empirical strategy,
followed by results and summary.
Turkey and the Syrian Civil War
Turkey-Syria relations have historically been tense,11, but they improved significantly following
the AKP’s ascension to power in 2001, and included mutual visits at the highest levels, joint cabi-
net meetings, military drills, and a free trade agreement (Yılmaz, 2013).
With the outbreak of violence in Syria in March 2011, Turkey urged Assad to introduce polit-
ical, economic, and social reforms (Taşpınar, 2012; Yılmaz, 2013), but soon became disillusioned
with the possibility of such changes (Yassin-Kassab, 2011). By the end of 2011, Turkey’s Prime
Minister at that time, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was openly calling for Assad’s resignation (Arsu,
2011; Burch, 2011). He became a stout supporter of the anti-Assad opposition, hosting militants
from the Free Syrian Army (Stack, 2011; Yılmaz, 2013), and–according to some–even aiding more
radical groups (Barkey, 2014) by allowing foreign jihadi fighters to cross from Turkey into Syria
(Al-Shishani, 2013). In early 2012, Turkey called for a joint NATO intervention to establish a no-fly
zone in northern Syria. NATO members, and especially the US, categorically ruled out military
intervention, and Turkey turned to diplomatic channels to promote a political settlement, while
clearly siding with and supporting the opposition in Syria (Yılmaz, 2013). Some within Turkey,
especially the Turkish Alawites who back the main Turkish opposition party CHP, have criticized
11The two countries had a territorial dispute over Turkey’s Hatay province–a predominantly Arab region which was
part of the French mandate in Syria after the First World War, and became a Turkish province in 1939 (Jorum, 2014;
Yassin-Kassab, 2011). Syria also accused Turkey of diverting the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers’ water for agricultural
projects in southeastern Turkey (Olson, 1995). During the 1980s and 1990s, Syria supported the Kurdish separatists
fighting against Turkey (the PKK), and provided a safe-haven in Syria for their leader, Abdullah Öcalan. In 1998,
following Turkish diplomatic and military pressure, the Syrian government decided to cut off its ties with the Kurdish
rebels, and expelled the PKK leader from Syria (Taşpınar, 2012).
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the alignment with the Sunni groups, and accused the government of engaging in a sectarian
policy (Ifantis, 2013). Several CHP members of the Parliament even visited Damascus to express
solidarity with Assad, and opposition to the Turkish intervention in Syria (Hürriyet Daily News,
2013; Yılmaz, 2013).12
The Syrian conflict has also affected Turkish-Kurdish relations. Disenfranchised by the Syrian
regime for decades, Syria’s Kurds took advantage of the turmoil to establish control in predomi-
nantly Kurdish-populated territories in Northern Syria (close to the border with Turkey) (Ifantis,
2013; Yılmaz, 2013). Unlike its policy towards the Sunni opposition, Turkey has refrained from
supporting the Syrian Kurds against Assad because of the concern that their empowerment may
embolden Kurds in Turkey to demand greater autonomy, especially given the close ties between
the Kurds on both sides of the border.13
Turkey’s opposition to the Assad regime, and its active support for the Sunni rebels in Syria
resulted in a number of confrontations, making the Turkish territories along the border especially
insecure. In the summer of 2012, the Syrian air defenses shot down a Turkish fighter jet near the
border (Blair and Henderson, 2012). In October 2012, five Turkish civilians were killed by Syrian
shells hitting the border town of Akçakale in Şanlıurfa province. In early 2013, NATO deployed
batteries of Patriot missiles in Adana, Kahramanmaraş, and Gaziantep provinces in the southeast
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2013). In May of 2013, twin car bombings in Reyhanlı in the
border province of Hatay that killed 52 people was blamed on the Syrian government by Turkish
officials (Fahim and Arsu, 2013).14 In late 2014, Turkey allowed 150 Kurdish fighters with heavy
weapons from North Iraq to cross through the Turkish territory by the border with Syria to fight
ISIS in the besieged town of Kobanı̂ (Yıldız, 2016).15 In August 2016, Turkey intervened militarily
12The sectarian influence and the partisan differences in Turkish foreign policy towards Syria peaked with the killing
of 52 civilians in a May 2013 bombing in Reyhanlı – a Turkish border district that is home to a large Arab Alawite
community with strong ties to the Syrian Alawites (Çağaptay, 2013). In response to this attack, Erdoğan highlighted
that the fatalities were Sunni, and openly criticized the opposition party CHP and its leader for their relations with the
Syrian regime (Letsch, 2013).
13Turkish and Syrian Kurds often share family connections, and the Syrian Kurdish movement (the PYD, and its
military branch the YPG that is fighting in Syria) is a close ally if not a subsidiary organization of the PKK (Ifantis, 2013;
Park, 2016).
14The suspects and motives for the attack still remain largely unknown.
15Unlike its opposition to the Kurdish Syrian PYD, Turkey adopts a more supportive approach towards the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq. This is, in part, because the KRG is critical of the PKK’s presence in north
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in northern Syria against ISIS and Kurdish-backed militants (Shaheen, 2016). In January 2018,
Turkey launched a second operation in northwestern Syria, called The Olive Branch, to take the
city of Afrin from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units’ (YPG) control (Shaheen, 2018). Overall,
these examples show that the Turkish areas close to the border with Syria have experienced some
of the fallout of the fighting in Syria more than the areas that are remote from the border.
Turkey and Syrian Refugees
Syrian refugees started arriving in Turkey in April 2011. Their migration intensified with the
escalation of violence in Syria. In response, the Turkish government opened several camps mostly
in provinces along the border, to provide the refugees with food, healthcare, and education (see
the map of camps in Figure A-1 in the Appendix). At the time of our survey, there were twenty
two camps in ten provinces.16 Despite their number, the camps could accommodate less than a
quarter of refugees that entered Turkey. The rest have settled outside among the local population
predominantly in camp provinces in southeastern Turkey (UNHCR, 2014).17
Although initially Turkey adopted an ‘open door’ policy towards the Syrian refugees, in 2012
the government announced that it would not accept more than 100,000 Syrians (‘red line’), and
began proposing a safe zone in North Syria, where the refugees would return (Sanchez, 2012).
The government has also tried to limit the number of refugees by assisting NGOs within Syria to
manage camps for the internally displaced civilians, and by implementing a ‘passage with careful
control’ (İçduygu, 2015, 7) to limit the entrance of individuals from some ethnic, religious, and
ideological backgrounds. These measures, however, had little effect on the continuous inflow of
refugees. The local population has also become increasingly discontent with the refugees’ pres-
ence (Ferris, 2016): some blamed them for the increase in housing prices (Sak, 2014), the rise in un-
employment, competition with local businesses (Çetingüleç, 2014; Güler, 2014), and even for social
ills such as thefts, murders, smuggling, and prostitution (Erdoğan, 2015). The ethnic makeup of
Iraq (Park, 2016; Yıldız, 2016).
16These provinces are Adana, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Osmaniye, and
Şanlıurfa.
17According to the UNHCR data, on June 6, 2014 (one day before the beginning of our survey), about 749,000 of
900,000 refugees resided in provinces with camps, but only about 220,000 of them resided in camps (UNHCR, 2014).
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the host communities to a large extent predicts their attitudes towards the refugees: for example,
areas in Hatay with predominantly Turkish-Alawite population (related to the Syrian Alawites)
strongly opposed the settling of Sunni Syrians in their areas (ICG, 2013, 19-25).
Although the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey is unprecedented in terms of their sheer
numbers, Turkey has faced refugee influxes in the past which has led to significant political ten-
sions. Most importantly, in 1991, after the Kurdish uprising against the regime of Saddam Hussein
in Iraq failed, close to 500,000 Iraqi Kurds sought refuge in Turkey. Turkey admitted these refugees
with great reluctance, and has immediately called for an international effort to create conditions
for their return. One of the concerns of Turkish government was that the presence of Iraqi Kurds
in Turkey could aggravate the domestic Kurdish conflict in Turkey (Kirişçi, 2000). As a result of
Turkey’s efforts in the international arena, a UN Security Council resolution was adopted, and a
set of military and relief operations known as ”Operation Provide Comfort” was launched. 11
countries participated in these operations, which led to the creation of a safe zone in Northern
Iraq for Iraqi Kurds. In a way similar to the logic of the Turkish operations in northern Syria to-
day, Turkish ruling elite was not pleased with the creation of this safe zone, because it allowed the
Kurdish insurgent group PKK to operate from northern Iraq more easily (Kirişçi, 1996). However,
it allowed the return of the great majority of the Kurds back to Iraq very quickly.
Support for Intervention
At the time of our survey, several options for Turkish foreign policy towards Syria were discussed.
They ranged from intervening militarily to remove Assad, to establishing a safe zone in North
Syria where the refugees and the displaced civilians could reside. Others favored more indirect
involvement by supporting opposition groups such as the Free Syrian Army or Islamist/Islamic
rebel groups (such as Al-Nusra Front). Finally, other options included staying away from the
conflict altogether, or aligning with the Assad regime, as Turkey did before mid-2011. It is im-
portant to understand that these various policy options were discussed alongside the threat and
occasional actual spill-over of violence from Syria into Turkey (especially in border areas), and in
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the context of a massive influx of refugees from the Syrian Civil War.
For the most part, Turkish public opinion has favored staying away from Syria, despite the
growing discontent about the refugees’ presence. Approximately 42 percent of the Turks sup-
ported neutrality and opposed any intervention in Syria in a nationally representative survey
from November 2013, about 7 months before our survey (Acikmese and Unver, 2013). The second
preference was assisting unarmed refugees (15 percent), followed by cutting commercial ties with
Syria but not implementing any political or military sanctions. Only 9 percent favored participat-
ing in a multilateral intervention in Syria–an option that was considered a more remote possibility
given the US opposition to introducing troops into Syria (Yılmaz, 2013).
Existing Literature and Hypotheses
What influences support for intervention? Our paper synthesizes studies from three different lit-
eratures. First, the refugee-conflict literature examines how refugees presence may be associated
with the spread of conflict both within and between states. Second, there is a lengthy literature,
rooted mostly in U.S. foreign policy, that examines the dispositional and ideological factors on
public opinion and the use of force. Finally, we also connect our research to a more recent litera-
ture on how exposure to potential negative externalities of a policy (i.e., the fallout from conflict)
influences public support for it.
Previous research suggests that an influx of refugees may have negative externalities for host
countries, and heighten the risk for conflict within the refugee-hosting state. Salehyan and Gled-
itsch (2006) propose three mechanisms through which refugees may spread conflict: they may
expand rebel networks and bring arms, exacerbate economic competition over resources, or dis-
rupt ethnic balance in their host societies. Several studies find a positive relationship between an
influx of refugees and an increase in the likelihood of civil conflict in the host societies (Weiner,
1996; Whitaker, 2003; Lischer, 2005; Loescher and Milner, 2004; Forsberg, 2014; Milton, Spencer
and Findley, 2013).18 Recent studies question this finding. Using sub-national data, these studies
18Additionally Choi and Salehyan (2013) find a positive correlation between refugees and terrorism, while Bove and
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fail to find a link between refugees’ presence and onset of political violence (Fisk, 2014; Shaver
and Zhou, 2015; Weidmann, Kuhn and Nikolic, 2007).
A large literature in economics suggests that the negative economic externalities of refugees
and immigrants are overstated (Cortes, 2004), or non-existent (Card, 2005). Rather immigrants
may be an economic boon to receiving countries as they can drive innovation (Hunt and Gauthier-
Loiselle, 2010).19 In the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey, more recent research presents nu-
anced findings that Syrian refugees displaced low-skill, low-wage workers in Turkey, but also cre-
ated new, high-wage jobs (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Ceritoglu, Yunculer, Torun and Tumen,
2017).
In addition to intrastate instability, Salehyan (2008) argues that the arrival of refugees may
spark conflicts between the host country and the country of origin. First, given the negative effect
of refugees’ presence, the host government may attempt to stem the flow of additional migrants
by intervening in the conflict in their country of origin in order to end the civil war there, or to
create safe zones that would prevent additional outflows of refugees. Second, the country of origin
may pursue armed actors associated with the refugees, especially if some refugees are associated
with rebels fighting against the government of their origin country. Furthermore, Greenhill (2011)
provides evidence that actors (both state and non-state) may use the threat of a mass migration of
refugees–and the negative externalities that may come with them–to coerce potential host states
towards more favorable foreign policies.
We examine how the negative externalities of hosting the refugees influence support for mili-
tary intervention in the refugee-causing conflict. Public opinion plays a crucial role in this calculus,
as negative externalities associated with refugees may force politicians to take actions to stem their
flow. For instance, Erdoğan and his then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu repeatedly called for
the creation of a safe zone in Northern Syria. They also lobbied U.S. to take the initiative for the
Böhmelt (2016) only finds that this is true for migrants from terrorism-prone contexts.
19Additional research suggests that perceptions of refugees hurting local populations are incorrect (Kreibaum, 2016),
and that they in fact can help local populations by attracting public assistance and improved public health outcomes
(Tatah, Delbiso, Rodriguez-Llanes, Cuesta and Guha-Sapir, 2016; Betts, Bloom, Kaplan and Omata, 2017), and have
positive spillovers to surrounding local economies (Taylor, Filipski, Alloush, Gupta, Valdes and Gonzalez-Estrada,
2016)
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creation of a safe zone, especially in the spring of 2013, when President Obama appeared to be con-
sidering a limited intervention in Syria (Al Jazeera, 2013). We expose individuals to information
about different negative effects of refugees’ presence, and evaluate how this information affects
their positions on intervention. Following Salehyan (2008), we hypothesize that exposure to negative
messages about refugees would increase the respondents’ support for intervening in Syria, and especially
support for policies that may stem additional flow of refugees, such as establishing safe zones in the country
of origin (Hypothesis 1).
Earlier studies on American foreign policy attitude formation suggest that foreign policy atti-
tudes are unprincipled and unstable, affected by emotions rather than reason (Morgenthau, 1978
cited in Holsti (1992)), and that the public follows cues from political leadership (Lipset, 1966 cited
in Baum and Potter (2008)). This view began to shift during the Vietnam War towards an alterna-
tive theory that suggested that events related to foreign policy and to war shape public opinion.
The most influential argument in this strand of literature is the ‘casualty hypothesis,’ according
to which public support for war decreases as military casualties increase (Mueller, 1973 cited in
Berinsky (2007)). Many studies, most of which use data from the US context, demonstrate the
importance of local casualties in support for war (Gartner, Segura and Wilkening, 1997; Karol and
Miguel, 2007). Other studies suggest that what is important is not the absolute number of casu-
alties, but also the perceived stakes and the importance of the war goals (Larson, 1996). Building
on this argument, Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler (2006) argue that the likelihood of success determines
public support for conflict, and that the public will tolerate significant numbers of casualties if
they believe in the rightness of war and the feasibility of success. Using data from the British con-
text, Johns and Davies (2014) demonstrate that the public is more willing to support interventions
when there is more international backing for this policy, and when the intervening country is part
of a larger coalition rather than acts alone.
Proximity to border may also affect individual attitudes towards intervention. According to
construal level theory, individual perception of close proximity events is very concrete and con-
text specific, and it becomes more abstract when the distance between the individual and the event
increases (Liberman and Trope, 2014). Concrete perception of events by the border can move indi-
12
viduals either in favor or against cooperation, depending on the context. Exposure to terrorism in
Israel (Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014) and Pakistan (Rehman and Vanin, 2017) strongly influences
attitudes towards domestic and foreign policy. Similarly, proximity to the US-Mexican border in-
creases support for border wall because respondents from these areas are directly exposed to such
issues as illegal immigration, warning signs, and presence of security personnel (Gravelle, 2018)
. This exposure heightens threat perception, and increases demand for border protection. Prox-
imity to the border can also enhance support for cooperation. Respondents who reside close to
a border with another European Union country are more supportive of integration (Berezin and
Dı́ez-Medrano, 2008), in part due to higher involvement in transnational networks and interac-
tions (Kuhn, 2012). Proximity to border can also attenuate the effect of structural factors, such as
partisanship as shown in the case of the US-Canada border, where proximity increases positive
attitudes towards the neighboring country conditional on political identification (Gravelle, 2014).
In sum, exposure due to distance to the positive or negative effects of a policy, and in particular
conflict, are an important determinant of attitudes.
Based on this literature, we hypothesize that individuals close to the border should be less swayed
by information on the negative effects of refugees (Hypothesis 2). We argue that proximity to border
increases the chances of exposure to the costs of intervention (retaliation by the Syrian army or the
rebels, additional inflow of refugees due to intervention). In the background section, we describe
how violence in Syria sometimes spills over into Turkey, and affects near border areas (shooting
down of the Turkish jet, mortar fire from Syria, and deployment of anti-missile batteries in border
provinces, as we describe above).20 In addition, we examine whether the different effect in border
areas is driven by warmer attitudes to refugees, or greater knowledge about the issue that weaken
the treatment effects on those areas.
In addition to these two hypotheses, we control for a diverse set of variables that could pro-
vide alternative explanations for support for intervention. One key variable we control for is the
respondent’s partisanship. This is because previous literature–developed primarily in the context
20Other factors that affect opinion include exposure to refugees, socio-economic status, or ethnicity–all of which we
control for in our regressions.
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of the US–suggests that elite cues shape public opinion on foreign policy. Using individual-level
data from different periods in the US, Berinsky (2007, 2009) show that individuals rarely possess
the information necessary to make cost/benefit calculations when forming their opinion on war.
Instead, they follow cues from political elites. When politicians from different parties agree on the
course of action, the public supports war. However, if there is no agreement between the major
political players, then public opinion on war diverges along partisan lines. As we discuss in the
background section, the AKP government at the time of our survey has been supportive of the
Syrian opposition, and in favor of removing Assad; whereas the main opposition party (CHP) has
been in favor of a more conciliatory approach towards Syria, prioritizing the end of the civil war
over the removal of Assad. We include partisanship indicators to control for the effect of elite cues
given the disagreement among the major parties in Turkey regarding the policy towards Syria.
Respondents’ personal attributes can also affect their positions. For instance, income and ed-
ucation have been shown to increase support for extrovert foreign policy (Kertzer, 2013), and we
control for these factors. Likewise, Rathbun et al. (2016) report that male gender and older age,
as well as traditional values, are associated with militant internationalism. We therefore control
for gender, age, and religiosity. Rathbun et al. (2016) also find that universal values are linked to
cooperative attitudes and concern for all human beings. We distinguish between urban and rural
dwellers because the former are more likely to be exposed to refugees (İçduygu, 2015). In addition,
we control for respondents’ exposure to refugees in their daily life, since contact with out-group
has been hypothesized to affect attitudes towards members of those groups (Paluck, Green and
Green, 2018). We also control for past exposure to conflict (residing in OHAL province) since it
can also affect support for future conflict (Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014). Finally, respondents’
ethnic identity can affect their position on intervention in Syria, since cross-border ethnic ties can
influence individual views on policies that can affect their co-ethnics in other countries (Paquin
and Saideman, 2017). Moreover, as discussed in the background section, a large number of Iraqi
Kurdish refugees had returned from Turkey to a safe zone in northern Iraq in 1991, where PKK
was able to operate with greater freedom (Kirişçi, 1996). Hence, in light of this past experience,
our non-Kurdish respondents may consider the creation of a safe zone in Syria as a move that can
14
potentially strengthen the Kurdish militant groups, including PKK and YPG. This is an additional
reason for controlling for ethnic identity in the particular case of Turkish public opinion towards
intervention in Syria.
Research Design
To test our hypotheses about how negative information of refugees (Hypothesis 1) and exposure
to negative externalities from interventions (Hypothesis 2) influence support for intervention, we
employ a survey experimental design in Turkey. This design offers several advantages. First, since
previous research suggests that geography–both in terms of refugee exposure, and closeness to the
Syrian border–is an important variable, our stratified sampling design allows to explicitly sample
for this kind of variation. By exposing respondents to different primes related to the effects of
refugees, we are able to causally test the effects of different proposed mechanisms of perceptions of
refugees on support for intervention. This is important, since most previous studies in the refugee-
conflict literature, while positing individual-level mechanisms, have examined the relationship
between refugees and violence at a macro-level, and not at the individual-level, and furthermore
not in a causally identified way.
Sampling
We randomly sampled districts using a stratified sampling procedure to produce variation on the
key factors associated with support for intervention: refugee presence (exposure), past incumbent
political support, and exposure to past violence associated with the Turkey-PKK conflict.21 Fig-
ure 1 shows the geographical distribution of our sample. The list of the provinces and districts, as
well as the number of respondents in each district, is presented in Table A-1 in the Appendix.22
21It is important to point out that we explicitly did not attempt to create a national sample. By focusing on a narrower
geographic region of Turkey (southeastern Turkey), we are better able to isolate the effect of variation in exposure to
refugees and past violence. As an analogy, if one were studying the effects of immigration–our sample would be
making comparisons about immigration exposure within Texas (regional), rather than between Montana and Texas (a
national sample).
22Turkey is a unitary state divided into 81 provinces. Each province is composed of districts.
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Figure 1: Map of the Sampled districts
The white areas represent our sampling frame, and the districts with dark borders are those where our survey took
place. As the map and the strata legend show, our survey experiment involved respondents from a diverse set of
districts – close to and far from the border; high, medium, and low level of refugee presence; high and low support for
the incumbent; and high and low exposure to past violence. The definitions of high, medium, and low are in the
Sampling subsection in the text.
16
The survey was conducted face-to-face by a team of professional enumerators. We conducted
training sessions with the enumerators to make sure they understand the survey and are com-
fortable executing it. Within each district, our enumerators chose a random starting point. They
then randomly selected households, and individuals within each household with the most recent
birthday were asked to participate in a survey about “current events.” Households, not individu-
als were substituted.
Our sampling strategy resulted in surveying 1,257 subjects, and the response rate was 34%.23
Sample demographics are shown in Table 1. We report summary statistics for all the independent
variables and their components separately for border and non-border provinces because we hy-
pothesize that the effect of treatments may be different for individuals who reside close to Syria,
and who may personally experience the potential negative effects of Turkish intervention.
Both the border and the non-border samples are well balanced on gender and across age
groups.24 Our respondents from border and non-border provinces are also similar with respect to
household income and religiosity. Non-border sample appears to be slightly more educated (38%
are college graduates compared to 31% among respondents from border provinces). About half of
both border and non-border province respondents were AKP supporters. Support for the major
opposition party, CHP, is only slightly higher in border provinces (12% of non-border and 15%
of border province respondents identify as CHP supporters). This slight difference is due to the
border province of Hatay, which is considered a CHP stronghold. In our regressions, we include
province dummies to account for such province-level factors.
Border and non-border provinces differ in terms of their ethnic makeup: we have slightly more
Kurdish respondents in non-border provinces (45% of the sample) than in border provinces (38%
of the sample). Likewise, border provinces have a higher percentage of Arab population, and this
is reflected in our sample (23% of border province respondents are Arabs compared to just 1% of
non-border sample). There are also slightly more Alawites among the border province respon-
23We used American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Response Rate 1 formula.
24Age group is coded on a 4-point scale, where (1) indicates the subject was 18-27 years old, (2) 28-37 years old, (3)
38-51 years old, and (4) 52 years or older.
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Table 1: Sample Demographics
Non-Border Province (N=777) Border Province (N=480)
Variable N Mean Std. Min Max N Mean Std. Min Max
Dev. Dev.
Female 777 0.50 0.50 0 1 480 0.49 0.49 0 1
Age group 777 2.44 1.09 1 4 480 2.43 1.10 1 4
Kurd 777 0.45 0.50 0 1 480 0.38 0.49 0 1
Arab 777 0.01 0.10 0 1 480 0.23 0.42 0 1
Alawite 756 0.06 0.25 0 1 452 0.10 0.30 0 1
Urban District 777 0.72 0.45 0 1 480 0.75 0.43 0 1
College graduate 776 0.38 0.49 0 1 479 0.31 0.46 0 1
Household income 737 5.00 2.80 1 16 460 4.97 2.47 1 16
AKP supporter 718 0.50 0.50 0 1 457 0.52 0.50 0 1
CHP supporter 718 0.12 0.33 0 1 457 0.15 0.35 0 1
MHP supporter 718 0.13 0.33 0 1 457 0.06 0.23 0 1
Kurdish party supporter 718 0.15 0.36 0 1 457 0.11 0.31 0 1
Ramadan survey 777 0.14 0.35 0 1 480 0.04 0.20 0 1
Factor variables
Wealth 777 0.43 0.32 0 1 480 0.40 0.29 0 1
Religious 742 0.66 0.25 0 1 444 0.67 0.23 0 1
Refugee exposure 736 0.46 0.34 0 1 463 0.59 0.23 0 1
Components of Wealth
Smart phone 777 0.27 0.45 0 1 480 0.25 0.43 0 1
Car 777 0.28 0.45 0 1 480 0.24 0.43 0 1
Computer 777 0.43 0.50 0 1 480 0.35 0.48 0 1
Washing machine 777 0.92 0.27 0 1 480 0.90 0.30 0 1
Dishwasher 777 0.56 0.50 0 1 480 0.57 0.50 0 1
Components of Religious
Cover Hair 759 0.77 0.33 0 1 476 0.72 0.28 0 1
Alcohol not OK 770 0.57 0.44 0 1 478 0.61 0.36 0 1
Pray 760 0.55 0.33 0 1 448 0.58 0.30 0 1
Components of self-reported Refugee Exposure
Public transport 747 0.50 0.42 0 1 478 0.74 0.31 0 1
Street 746 0.60 0.41 0 1 477 0.75 0.28 0 1
Business 747 0.25 0.40 0 1 472 0.27 0.37 0 1
Social life 743 0.39 0.42 0 1 468 0.48 0.38 0 1
Market 745 0.53 0.42 0 1 474 0.68 0.32 0 1
Border refers to the border between Turkey and Syria. The border provinces in our sample are Hatay,
Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanliurfa, and Mardin.
Wealth, Religious, and Refugee Exposure are factor variables created using the components listed below
each of them. The differences in the number of respondents are due to missing values.
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dents compared to non-border provinces sample (10% and 6%, respectively).25 Because of these
differences, we control for ethnicity in all our regressions. Finally, border province respondents,
unsurprisingly, report higher levels of exposure to refugees.
Treatments
Once a randomly selected person within a household agreed to participate, the survey proceeded
as follows. First, subjects were asked basic demographic questions about their age, household size,
and their community. Then the enumerators asked subjects several warm-up questions about
how they are doing in general, and how they feel about the direction of Turkey. We then ran-
domly assigned subjects to one of five experimental conditions described in Table 2, four of which
were related to the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey. In the Control condition, subjects did not
receive any information about the refugees. In the other four treatments, the enumerator read
a brief statement heightening the salience of the refugees in Turkey, and then subjects received
treatments (See Appendix for exact wording). The Economic Cost, Ethnic Balance, and Militant Ties
treatments were all meant to reflect the key mechanisms through which refugees influence atti-
tudes towards violence (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). The Women and Children treatment was
meant to balance out the negative tone of the treatments, with a more positive tone, and also to re-
flect AKP’s justification of its open-door policy towards the refugees by calling the Syrian refugees
Turkey’s “brothers and sisters.”26 It was also used to differentiate whether the negative aspects of
the refugees (Economic Cost, Ethnic Balance, and Militant Ties), or simply mentioning the refugees
25Most Kurds, speak and understand Turkish as well as Kurdish. 97% of the interviews were done in Turkish, and
only 3% of the interviews (43) were done in Kurdish. Instead of asking whether someone is a Kurd or not (i.e. binary
classification), which is a sensitive question in Turkey, we asked how much each respondent identifies him/herself as
Turkish, Kurdish, and as a member of other minority groups. We also asked about languages that respondents speak.
Similar to previous studies of public opinion in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2014; Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu, 2007), we classify
someone as Kurdish if they list their first language as Kurdish. There is a strong correlation between identifying as a
Kurd and having Kurdish as the primary language (ρ ≈ 0.65). We also code whether a respondent is an Arab based
on whether they list Arabic as their first language (9.5% of our sample are Arabs). Finally, we also attempt to identify
Alawite respondents, since Alawite identity may affect positions on foreign policy towards Syria. We code respondents
as Alawites if they have Ali’s picture in their house. Only 7.8% of our sample are Alawites. See the Appendix for the
exact wording behind these variables.
26See e.g. Idiz (2014).
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(Women and Children) influenced respondents’ attitudes.27 Randomization checks are presented in
the Appendix in Tables A-12 and A-13.
Table 2: Experimental Conditions
Treatment View on Refugees Description
Control — —
Economic Cost Negative Syrian refugees impose large costs
on government resources, and increase
unemployment among Turkish citizens.
Ethnic Balance Negative Syrian refugees upset Turkey’s ethnic balance.
Militant Ties Negative Syrian refugees have ties to militant groups
that make Turkey less safe.
Women and Children Positive Turkey’s refugee policy has saved many innocent
women and children.
Following the treatment, the enumerators asked subjects their views on our main dependent
variables: the possibility of Turkey 1) using force to remove Assad and 2) to establish a safe zone in
northern Syria; 3) Turkey’s support for all opposition in Syria or 4) only for the Islamic opposition;
5) the possibility that Turkey supports Assad; and 6) the option of staying away from the conflict
altogether. Finally, we also asked subjects a series of questions about their contact and exposure to
Syrian refugees and their religious views.28 Further information on the exact wording of specific
items is included in the Appendix.
Dependent variables
We measure our variables of interest using six questions on the possible actions that Turkey can
undertake in Syria: 1) use force to remove Assad; 2) use force to establish a safe zone in northern
27We might be concerned that our treatments are “double-barreled,” in that we are priming both the refugees and
a mechanism. However, we argue for two reasons that this is not problematic. First, our treatments are designed to
mimic elite cues. Elite cues do not simply argue that refugees are a threat, but also usually point to why (e.g. stealing
jobs, increasing rent, committing crimes, etc.). Finally, we would be concerned if we found that all of the treatments
moved respondents in the same direction—then we would be unable to identify whether it was the refugee prime
inherent in the treatments, or the different messages (mechanisms) about research which shifted attitudes. However, as
we show in the Results section, the treatments have very different effects on attitudes suggesting that the mechanism
matters, and that the treatments effectively are differentiated from one another.
28How often they pray, whether they believe that women should cover their hair, and their attitude towards alcohol.
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Syria; 3) support all opposition; 4) support Islamic opposition; 5) support Assad; and 6) stay away
from the conflict. Respondents rank their support for each policy option on a scale from 1 (strongly
oppose) to 7 (strongly support). Figure 2 presents the distribution of answers to these questions.
This plot shows that the most preferred option is staying away (51% support, 35% oppose, and
14% neutral). The next most favorable course of action is to use force to establish a safe zone
in northern Syria (34% support, 54% oppose, and 12% neutral). The least desirable option is for
Turkey to support Assad (14% support, 72% oppose, and 14% neutral). Public attitude is similar
for support for Islamic opposition (25% support, 64% oppose, and 11% neutral) and all opposition
(21% support, 64% oppose, and 21% neutral), as well as for using force to remove Assad (22%
support, 61% oppose, and 17% neutral).
The answers to these six questions are highly correlated (α = 0.75), with all questions posi-
tively correlated, except for stay away (negatively correlated with the rest). To aggregate all these
answers, we generate a new scale variable, Pro-intervention attitudes that combines responses to
four questions (use force to remove Assad; use force to establish a safe zone in northern Syria; sup-
port all opposition; and support Islamic opposition). As we show in the Appendix, the responses
to these questions are highly correlated (α = 0.87, factor loadings above 0.8), which indicates that
they capture the same phenomenon and represent actions that Turkey could take to change status
quo in Syria. In the Appendix, we also present factor analysis of the six and of the four questions.
In our empirical tests, we focus on Pro-intervention attitudes as our main dependent variable,
and in addition examine the effect of our treatments and the other independent variables of inter-
est on each of the four questions separately. We rescale all dependent variables to lie between 0
and 1 to allow for easier interpretation.
Estimation
We are interested in how information about different potential effects of hosting the refugees
(our treatments) affects the dependent variables while controlling for fundamental attributes –
partisanship, residing near the border, refugee exposure, past exposure to violence, and ethnicity.
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These plots represent the answers to our six questions on foreign policy options. The answers range from strongly
oppose (1) to strongly support (7). The number on the left of each bar represents the percent of respondents who
oppose the given action (responses 1,2, or 3); the number in the middle represents the percent of neutral responses (4);
and the number on the right represents the percent of respondents who support the given action (responses 5, 6, or 7).
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Given that we hypothesize that intervention is likely to have a larger impact on individuals re-
siding in border provinces, we interact our treatments with a dummy for residing in a border
province. Our empirical specification for individual i in province j is the following OLS model:
Yij = α1 × T i + α2 ×Borderj + α3 ×Borderj × Ti (1)
+ β1 ×AKPi + β2 × CHPi + β3 ×MHPi + β4 ×KurdishPartyi
+ β5 ×Refugee Exposurei + β6 ×Kurdi + β7 ×Arabi + β8 ×Alawitei
+ β9 ×OHALj + γ ×Xi + µj + εi
where Yij is the individual response to our dependent variables, Ti is a vector of dummy
variables which indicates which refugee treatment individual i received; Borderj is a dummy
variable indicating whether the respondent resides in a border province; AKPi, CHPi,MHPi and
KurdishPartyi are dummy variables that indicates whether individual i is an AKP, CHP, MHP, or
Kurdish party supporter29, respectively (the omitted category are non-partisans or supporters of
other parties); Kurdi, Arabi, and Alawitei are dummy variables that indicate whether respondent
i is a Kurd, an Arab, or an Alawite, respectively (the omitted category are non-minority Turks and
other minority groups). OHALj is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual lives in a former
OHAL or adjacent zone province. Xi is a vector of individual controls.30 We control for other
province-level covariates by including a province-level dummy (µj). εi is a normally distributed
error. We allow for differential effects of the treatment for non-border respondents (α1) versus
border respondents (α1 + α3), to examine whether proximity to Syria moderates the effects of our
treatment on support for intervention. We are also interested in the effect of the key observational
variables (β’s).
29We code supporters of Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) together as Kur-
dish party supporters.
30It includes age group, religiosity index, college degree, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for
whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10% of the surveys were completed during Ramadan).
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Main Results
Below we test our two main hypotheses: (1) negative primes about Syrian refugees make local
Turkish citizens more supportive of intervention in Syrian civil war; (2) negative primes affect
respondents in non-border provinces differently from those in border provinces.
We begin estimating the effect of our treatments and observational variables of interest on
Pro-intervention Attitudes – a scale variable composed of answers to four items that represent in-
tervention to change the status quo in Syria (using force to remove Assad, using force to establish
a safe zone in Northern Syria, supporting all opposition, and supporting the Islamic opposition).
Table 3 presents four models that vary in the control variables and the province fixed effects that
they include. We also asked the respondents about their support for a pro-Assad policy and for
staying away from Syria altogether. The findings regarding these questions are in Table A-20 in
the Appendix.
The Militant Ties treatment positively affects support for intervention in non-border provinces,
whereas in border provinces the effect is negative (both effects are statistically significant, p <
0.05). The Ethnic Balance treatment also increases support for intervention in Syria in non-border
provinces, but only when we include control variables. Other treatments (economic cost of hosting
the refugees, and saving innocent women and children) do not affect positions on intervention.
The AKP supporters are more in favor of intervention, and the CHP supporters are less supportive
of it. Kurds, and Alawites do not differ from non-minority Turks in their support for intervention,
whereas Arabs are more supportive of intervention, but this result is marginally significant (p <
0.1). Finally, higher exposure to refugees is associated with a stronger support for intervention in
Syria.
In Table 4, we present the effects of our treatments on individual questions about intervention.
The results show that our findings in Table 3 are driven primarily by responses to three questions:
remove Assad, establish a safe zone in Northern Syria, and support all rebels. The Militant Ties
treatment increases support in non-border provinces for this policies, and has the opposite effect
on respondents from border provinces (p < 0.05). Support for the Islamic opposition in Syria is
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Table 3: Support for Changing Status Quo in Syria – Border vs. Non-Border Provinces
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Economic Cost -0.011 -0.016 0.002 0.009
(0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Ethnic Balance 0.048 0.048 0.068∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Militant Ties 0.075∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Women & Children -0.021 -0.018 -0.005 0.002
(0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
Economic Cost X Border Prov. -0.007 -0.009 -0.035 -0.050
(0.054) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052)
Ethnic Balance X Border Prov. -0.050 -0.053 -0.074 -0.074
(0.056) (0.050) (0.052) (0.054)
Militant Ties X Border Prov. -0.141∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053)
Women & Children X Border -0.007 -0.011 -0.035 -0.035
Prov. (0.056) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
Border Prov. 0.055 0.029 -0.003 -0.014
(0.038) (0.061) (0.067) (0.069)
OHAL 0.008 0.010
(0.082) (0.082)








CHP Supporter -0.079∗∗ -0.062∗
(0.031) (0.034)
MHP Supporter -0.017 -0.012
(0.037) (0.038)
Kurdish Parties Supporter -0.049 -0.042
(0.033) (0.032)
AKP Supporter 0.062∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024)
Constant 0.306∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.045) (0.056)
Province Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Yes
Observations 1200 1200 1109 1077
R-squared 0.01 0.20 0.23 0.24
Dependent variable: Support for changing status quo in Syria (0-1). Higher values indicate greater
support for intervention. Scale composed of oppose vs. support removing Assad, creating a safe zone
in nothern Syria, supporting all rebel forces, and supporting only Islamic rebel forces. Additional
controls are age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for
whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Signif.: ∗10% ∗∗5% ∗∗∗1%.
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not affected by our treatments. In addition, our Economic Cost and Women and Children treatments
do not affect attitudes towards different forms of intervention.
Moving onto our non-experimental variables, we find that partisan identity is also correlated
with positions on intervention: the AKP supporters are more likely to be in favor of establishing
a safe zone, supporting all rebels as well as the Islamic opposition. The CHP supporters are less
supportive of using force to remove Assad or to establish a safe zone. We also find some evidence
that ethnicity is correlated with positions: Arab respondents are more in favor of supporting the
Islamic opposition while Kurdish respondents are more in favor of supporting all as well as Is-
lamic opposition. In contrast to our expectations based on the establishment of a safe zone for
Iraqi Kurdish refugees in 1991, Kurdish respondents are not less likely to support the establish-
ment of a safe zone in Syria. Finally, refugee exposure is positively correlated with support for all
types of intervention. Only in the case of establishing a safe zone, it barely misses significance at
10 percent (p-value is .12).
Figure 3 (a bootstrapped coefficient plot) demonstrates that our findings are substantively
meaningful. In non-border provinces, the Militant Ties and the Ethnic Balance increase support for
intervention by 10 and 7 percentage points, respectively (95% significance level). AKP supporters
and Arab respondents, and those who report higher exposure to refugees in their daily life are
also more likely to support intervention (7, 6, and 11 percentage points increase, respectively).
The effect of Militant Ties treatment in non-border provinces is thus comparable in magnitude to
the effect of partisanship. In border provinces, the Militant Ties treatment reduces support for
intervention by about 7 percentage points, but this effect is significant only at 90% significance
level.
The coefficient plots for the individual items (remove Assad, safe zone, support all rebels,
and support the Islamic opposition) are in the Appendix (Figures A-2 through A-5), and they are
consistent with the findings in Table 4. The Militant Ties treatment has a positive effect in non-
border provinces for removing Assad, establishing a safe zone, and supporting all rebels (but
not Islamic rebels specifically). In border provinces, this treatment has a negative effect, but it is
statistically significant only for support of using force to establish a safe zone in Northern Syria.
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Table 4: Support for Specific Policies of Intervention – Border vs. Non-Border Provinces
Remove Assad Safe Zone All Rebels Islamic Rebels
Economic Cost 0.019 -0.003 0.018 0.009
(0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039)
Ethnic Balance 0.096∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.055 0.045
(0.042) (0.044) (0.039) (0.040)
Militant Ties 0.103∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.041)
Women & Children 0.027 0.007 -0.001 -0.007
(0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037)
Economic Cost X Border Prov. -0.039 -0.039 -0.075 -0.049
(0.065) (0.068) (0.058) (0.062)
Ethnic Balance X Border Prov. -0.076 -0.131∗ -0.033 -0.029
(0.066) (0.069) (0.063) (0.064)
Militant Ties X Border Prov. -0.170∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.048
(0.065) (0.069) (0.063) (0.065)
Women & Children X Border -0.042 -0.077 -0.018 -0.015
Prov. (0.066) (0.067) (0.060) (0.062)
Border Prov. -0.017 -0.003 -0.013 -0.007
(0.083) (0.083) (0.075) (0.078)
OHAL 0.099 -0.016 -0.023 -0.040
(0.090) (0.090) (0.099) (0.097)
Refugee Exposure 0.141∗∗∗ 0.077 0.090∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
Kurdish -0.027 -0.003 0.090∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
Arab 0.037 0.036 0.068∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
Alawite 0.047 0.019 -0.053 -0.030
(0.044) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041)
CHP Supporter -0.103∗∗∗ -0.076∗ -0.045 -0.016
(0.039) (0.043) (0.037) (0.039)
MHP Supporter -0.039 0.007 -0.013 0.004
(0.044) (0.049) (0.044) (0.043)
Kurdish Parties Supporter -0.072∗ -0.032 -0.013 -0.042
(0.042) (0.043) (0.037) (0.039)
AKP Supporter 0.045 0.077∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.310∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.073) (0.065) (0.067)
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1063 1061 1041 1031
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.26
Dependent variables (0-1): Support for removing Assad (col. 1), creating a safe zone (col. 2), all rebel forces
(col. 3), Islamic rebel forces (col. 4), All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age,
religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for urban resident and for whether the interview
was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: ∗10% ∗∗5%
∗∗∗1%.
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Figure 3: Support for Intervention in Syria – Border / Non-Border Provinces Comparison
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This finding is particularly interesting because such a safe zone would be across the border from
the respondents who oppose. Furthermore, the Ethnic Balance treatment also has a positive effect
on support in non-border provinces for removing Assad and for establishing a safe zone in Syria,
and it does not affect positions among respondents from border provinces. Partisan identification
is also correlated with some positions: AKP supporters are more in favor of safe zone, support for
all rebels and for Islamic opposition. CHP supporters are against removing Assad.
Support for Intervention and Distance from the Border
In this section, we explore whether the effect of our treatments varies by distance to the near-
est border crossing,31 to make sure the differential effect of the Militant Ties treatment in border
and non-border provinces is robust to alternative measures of proximity to border. Using the
Geographic Information System (GIS) software, we identified the nearest crossing to each of the
districts in our sample, and calculated the shortest distance in kilometers between the centroid of
each district and its nearest crossing. As Figure 1 shows, our sample is diverse in terms of dis-
tance from border crossings: a quarter of our respondents resides within 32 kilometers of a border
crossing, and the median distance to the border is about 95 kilometers. We use proximity to border
crossings because one of the potential fallout of intervention is an additional influx of refugees.
This may affect areas closer to crossings more than other areas. In Table A-14 in the Appendix, we
present results using the shortest Euclidean distance to the border with Syria (and not to a border
crossings). The substantive results remain the same.
We interact each of our treatment indicators with the log of distance to the border in kilome-
ters. In Table 5, we first report the findings regarding the scale dependent variable Pro-intervention
Attitudes, followed by our results for the individual items. Overall, they are consistent with our
main results using border province dummies: the Militant Ties treatment makes respondents re-
siding farther away from the border more supportive of intervention, whereas the effect on those
residing closer to the border is negative.
31Location of border crossings are from US Department of State (2015).
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Table 5: Support for Intervention – Distance to the Nearest Border Crossing with Syria in km (log)
Change SQ Remove Assad Safe Zone All Rebels Islamic Rebels
Economic Cost -0.053 -0.039 -0.031 -0.098 -0.019
(0.125) (0.150) (0.160) (0.133) (0.142)
Ethnic Balance -0.010 0.016 -0.100 0.027 0.069
(0.126) (0.149) (0.162) (0.145) (0.139)
Militant Ties -0.214∗ -0.205 -0.284∗ -0.230∗ -0.036
(0.115) (0.139) (0.154) (0.138) (0.135)
Women & Children -0.044 -0.020 -0.144 -0.075 0.032
(0.123) (0.143) (0.153) (0.136) (0.135)
Economic Cost X Distance 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.020 0.001
(0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032)
Ethnic Balance X Distance 0.012 0.011 0.031 0.003 -0.009
(0.029) (0.034) (0.037) (0.033) (0.031)
Militant Ties X Distance 0.059∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.014
(0.026) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031)
Women & Children X Distance 0.008 0.007 0.029 0.016 -0.011
(0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030)
Distance 0.078∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.055 0.078∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.054) (0.061) (0.047) (0.050)
OHAL 0.005 0.093 -0.019 -0.027 -0.042
(0.083) (0.090) (0.090) (0.100) (0.098)
Refugee Exposure 0.104∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.074 0.088∗ 0.103∗∗
(0.038) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
Kurdish 0.052 -0.023 -0.000 0.092∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
Arab 0.056∗ 0.025 0.034 0.064 0.093∗∗
(0.034) (0.043) (0.050) (0.041) (0.041)
Alawite -0.007 0.042 0.015 -0.053 -0.032
(0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.039) (0.040)
CHP Supporter -0.072∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.083∗ -0.055 -0.029
(0.034) (0.040) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039)
MHP Supporter -0.008 -0.033 0.015 -0.007 0.007
(0.038) (0.045) (0.049) (0.044) (0.043)
Kurdish Parties Supporter -0.036 -0.062 -0.022 -0.006 -0.035
(0.033) (0.042) (0.043) (0.037) (0.040)
AKP Supporter 0.066∗∗∗ 0.045 0.079∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Constant -0.076 -0.259 0.107 -0.130 -0.456∗
(0.206) (0.263) (0.292) (0.228) (0.241)
Observations 1077 1063 1061 1041 1031
R-squared 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.26
Dependent variables (0-1): Pro-intervention Attitudes (col. 1), removing Assad (col. 2), creating a safe zone (col. 3), all rebel forces (col. 4), and Islamic
rebel forces (col. 5), All models include province fixed effects and additional controls: age, religiosity index, education, wealth index, sex, dummies for
urban resident and for whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan (only 10%). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signif.: ∗10% ∗∗5%
∗∗∗1%.
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In Figure 4, we show the marginal effect of the Militant Ties treatment close to a border crossing
(10th percentile, or the log of 13 kilometers32) and far from a border crossing (90th percentile, or
the log of 245 kilometers33), compared to the control group. Far from a crossing, this treatment
has a positive effect on support for using force in Syria, to remove Assad, to establish a safe zone
in Northern Syria, and on support for all rebels (11, 11, 16, and 13 percentage points increase,
respectively, comparable to the effect of this treatment in non-border provinces). This treatment
has no effect on respondents residing 13km from a border crossing. What is perhaps most striking,
is the differential effect of the Militant Ties treatment on support for the safe zone near and far
from border crossings. This is not surprising since border areas are precisely those that would be
explicitly affected based on their proximity to the proposed safe zones.
Additional Robustness Checks
In Table A-15 in the Appendix, we show that the differential effect of the Militant Ties treatment
exists also for respondents from border districts compared to those who reside in non-border
districts. This is consistent with our main results based on comparison of border and non-border
provinces.
It is possible that the ethnic composition of border and non-border areas differs, and this may
influence our findings. In the main regression, we include indicators for Kurdish, Arab, and Alaw-
ite respondents. In Table A-16 in the Appendix, we omit minority respondents, and repeat our
tests only using responses of non-minority participants. The coefficient of Militant Ties is positive,
however it is statistically significant only for support for removing Assad and for establishing a
safe zone. The interaction term is negative, but statistically significant only for the overall support
for intervention, for removing Assad, and for establishing a safe zone. Overall these results are
consistent with our main findings, despite the drop in statistical significance in some cases. Ex-
cluding minority respondents decreases the number of respondents, and may account for some
32Some respondents from Kilis and Hatay fall into this category.
33This is the approximate distance of respondents from Muş to the closest border crossing.
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of the Militant Ties Treatment close and far from the border
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loss in statistical significance.
Our findings–that the Militant Ties treatment moves mainly non-border respondents–could
also be due to the border respondents being better informed about the effects of hosting refugees,
and are thus not swayed by our treatments. In Table A-17 in the Appendix, we examine whether
respondents in border provinces differ from those in non-border provinces in their knowledge
of the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey, and find that they do not. We also find that higher
exposure to Syrian refugees is not related to more accurate knowledge–in this case knowing the
correct number of refugees that reside in Turkey at the time of the survey. This results suggests
that heterogeneous treatment effect we find–in border and non-border provinces–is not due to
better informed respondents in the former.
Another potential explanation of our findings is that the border respondents have warmer at-
titudes towards the refugees due to their more frequent and more positive interactions with them,
and because of these warmer attitudes, our primes emphasizing refugees’ potential negative ef-
fects are not effective amongst the border respondents. To explore this possibility, we ran regres-
sions where the dependent variable is respondents’ answer to a feeling thermometer question
towards particular ethnic groups of Syrian refugees. As we report in Table A-18 in the Appendix,
the border respondents do not show warmer or colder feelings towards Sunni, Arab, Kurdish or
Alawite refugees. These results suggest that the heterogeneous treatment effects in border and
non-border provinces are not due to the border respondents having warmer attitudes towards the
refugees.34
An additional possibility is whether there was selective out-migration from the border provinces
due to security concerns. This could lead to baseline differences between the survey respondents
by the border and those far from the border, and provide a potential alternative explanation of our
findings. However, the province-level internal migration data show that border provinces in our
sample have not experienced a larger outflow of residents relative to the non-border provinces.
According to the data from Turkish Institute of Statistics, the out migration was lower in non-
34A related alternative explanation also suggests that respondents exposed to refugees may favor intervention since
they see the high civilian costs of civil wars, and want to end them. We are thankful to a reviewer for suggesting this
explanation.
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border provinces both in 2013 - the year before our survey - and in 2014 (2.7 vs. 3.1 percent in
2013, and 2.8 vs 3.4 percent in 2014).35
Finally, we report the results with respect to support for specific policies of intervention using
an ordered probit model, since the responses to these question are coded on an ordinal scale. Our
results hold, and they are reported in Table A-19 in the Appendix.
Conclusion
We show that individuals in Turkey–a major host country–are concerned about Syrian refugees,
and this leads some to want to intervene in civil war in Syria. Yet we find that only certain neg-
ative messages about refugees consistently sway attitudes in favor of intervention. In particular,
emphasizing the refugees’ ties with militants increases support for intervention, but only for those
who live further from the border and are buffered from any potential intervention fallout. In con-
trast, emphasizing the economic costs or ethnic differences of the refugees has inconsistent or null
effects.
Partisanship is also an important factor, as we find individuals follow cues from their party
leaders (AKP and CHP) in forming opinions about intervention. Likewise, the positive relation-
ship between refugee exposure and support for intervention in Syria suggests that individuals
want to take action and intervene in response to refugees’ inflow. However, even after control-
ling for these factors, we find that information about refugees’ potential ties with militants can
change positions about intervention depending on the individual’s vulnerability to the costs of
such intervention.
We further find that the effects of reminding individuals about the negative externalities of
35It is possible that the composition of those who migrated out of border and non-border provinces may be different.
Our data do not allow us to test for this possibility. However, using data from the Turkish Institute of Statistics on age
and education levels of individuals who migrate out of provinces, we show that there are no significant differences
in the population share of adult population and population share of college graduates that migrated out of border vs.
non-border provinces in 2013 or in 2014. The percentages of adult population who migrated out of border provinces
in 2013 and 2014 are 2.4 and 2.7, while the same percentages for non-border provinces is 2.9 and 3. The percentages of
college graduates who migrated out of border provinces in 2013 and 2014 are .52 and .56, while the same percentages
for non-border provinces are .64 and .73. Simple tests of difference in means show that none of these differences are
significant.
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hosting refugees on public support for intervention vary. Locals who reside far from the border,
and do not bear the costs of intervention become more supportive of intervention following in-
formation about the possibility that some refugees might have ties to militants. Conversely, locals
who reside closer to the border actually slightly reduce their support for intervention when they
are reminded of such ties. These findings are consistent with previous studies about how proxim-
ity is associated with preferences. In sum, which people are expected to bear the costs associated
with different foreign policy options are an important determinant of public opinion. We also
demonstrated that these results cannot be explained by warmer attitudes towards refugees in the
vicinity of the border and by greater knowledge about the issue that weakens the effects of our
treatments. Official data is also not consistent with the explanation that migration out of border
areas explains these results.36
Our survey makes three important contributions to understanding support for intervention.
First, we show that the public in a developing, non-US context holds principled foreign policy
attitudes that reflect key partisan, and to a lesser extent, ethnic divisions about high stakes policy
choices such as the Turkish intervention in Syria. Second, elite messages (primes) about refugees
influence foreign policy attitudes–in particular those emphasizing the militant ties of refugees.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, these messages are moderated by proximity to the border
with Syria.
Taken together, our findings suggest that purely top-down (Berinsky, 2009), or structured ide-
ology or partisanship-based models (Rathbun, Kertzer, Reifler, Goren and Scotto, 2016) are incom-
plete. Exposure to the potential costs of conflict is an important determinant of attitudes. From
a normative perspective, our findings are somewhat encouraging as they suggest that citizens
are not myopic about foreign policy positions. Rather citizens weigh the potential benefits and
costs of different policies, and how these policies may directly influence them. We argue that the
question of how differential exposure to the costs of different foreign policies influences attitudes
remains understudied. It further suggests that elites may not be as easily able to sway the public
36An alternative explanation may be that locals perceive the (economic) benefits from refugees to be high and perhaps
do not want any intervention to disrupt this. While this is speculative, we are grateful to a reviewer pointing this
alternative interpretation.
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on foreign policy–especially the parts of the public that have to bear the costs of foreign policy
actions.
This last point has clear policy implications in the case of Turkey and the public support for
Turkish interventions in Syria. Turkey is currently considering to launch a new military operation
in northern Syria (Hürriyet, 2018). At the same time, some nationalist Turkish politicians are
propagating the view that Syrians constitute a major economic, cultural, and security threat to
Turkish state and society, and therefore, they should return to Syria (Özdağ, 2018). Our results
indicate that such elite messages have a limited effect on the Turkish public support for military
operations in Syria. Only those messages that emphasize Syrian refugees constituting a potential
security threat should increase support for military operation among Turkish citizens living far
from the border. Those closer to the border may be either not affected by these messages or become
less supportive of a new operation.
36
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lar [Identities, Kurdish Question and the Solution Process in Turkey: Public Perceptions and
Attitudes].”. [Online at http://www.hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/
docs/OSI_Yurttaslik_2014_Cozum_Sureci_Sunum_Basin_v08.259182726.pdf].
Yılmaz, Nuh. 2013. “Syria: The View From Turkey.”. [Online at http://www.ecfr.eu/
article/commentary_syria_the_view_from_turkey139; posted 19-June-2013].
Zeitzoff, Thomas. 2014. “Anger, exposure to violence, and intragroup conflict: A ’Lab in the Field’
experiment in Southern Israel.” Political Psychology 35(3):309–335.
46
